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Recent Decision
ENFORCING PLEA BARGAINS: A STEP
BEYOND CONTRACT LAW
Cooper v. United States
In Cooper v. United States,' the Fourth Circuit expanded the rights of
defendants who take part in plea bargaining2 by recognizing that expectations
reasonably formed by defendants as a result of negotiations with the govern-
ment deserve constitutional protection even though those negotiations are not
embodied in the form of an enforceable contract.3
FACTS
Cooper, a Drug Enforcement Administration informer, was indicted in the
District of Maryland on charges of witness bribery and obstruction of justice.4 At
approximately 11:00 a.m. on May 11, 1977, Cooper's defense counsel and an
Assistant United States Attorney entered plea negotiations in which the
government attorney offered to dismiss all but one count of the indictment and
to bring Cooper's cooperation with the government to the sentencing judge's
attention. In return, Cooper was to plead guilty to the one remaining count and
continue to cooperate with federal authorities. The government attorney made
known that the plea proposal would be held open for acceptance for one week,'
giving no indication that his plea proposal was subject to the approval of his
superior. s Defense counsel immediately visited Cooper in the local jail where he
was incarcerated and obtained his agreement to the proposal.
At noon the same day, defense counsel began a series of unsuccessful
attempts to contact the government attorney and inform him of Cooper's
acceptance. At 1:30 p.m., the Assistant United States Attorney was instructed
by his superior, the United States Attorney for the District of Maryland, to
withdraw the plea proposal. When defense counsel finally contacted the
government attorney, he was informed of the withdrawal before he could voice
Cooper's acceptance.' Defense counsel unsuccessfully protested to the assistant
government attorney and his superior that the agreement was complete and its
withdrawal improper.' A pre-trial hearing on defendant's motion to compel
1. 594 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1979).
2. The Supreme Court has defined plea bargaining as, "the disposition of criminal
charges by agreement between the prosecutor and the accused. Santobello v. New
York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971).
3. 594 F.2d at 18.
4. Id. at 13.
5. Id. at 15 n.2.
6. Id. at 19.
7. Brief for Appellant, app. at 9, Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12 (4th Cir.
1979).
8. In addition to claiming the agreement was complete, Cooper's counsel "indicated
that [withdrawal of the plea offerl placed I him I in a precarious position with regard to his
client." Id. at 5.
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enforcement of the proposal also proved futile. The trial court, relying on
traditional contract law, concluded that the plea agreement was not enforceable
because the offeror had exercised his right to revoke the offer without reason
prior to the offeree's communication of acceptance. 9 It also concluded that the
withdrawal of the offer was not barred by the doctrine of promissory estoppel 0
because Cooper had not relied on the offer to his detriment." After he was
convicted and sentenced, Cooper appealed on several grounds. The Fourth
Circuit found no merit in his claim of prejudicial error during the trial, 12 but
vacated the judgment upon finding constitutional error in the district court's
refusal to enforce the government's plea proposal.'
3
THE OPINION OF THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
The Fourth Circuit began its analysis in Cooper by noting that although the
Supreme Court accepted plea bargaining and recognized a constitutional right
to fairness in the bargaining process,' 4 the Court had left undefined the scope of
this constitutional right. Pointing out that courts often apply the standards of
substantive and remedial contract law when reviewing plea bargaining
practices and affording relief to defendants unfairly treated in the process,' 5 the
court in Cooper questioned the extent to which contract law may be drawn upon
to define the limits of the defendants' constitutional rights. 6 Since the
government had withdrawn its plea proposal before Cooper accepted it, the court
concluded that under classic contract law Cooper had no right to enforcement of
the proposal.' 7 In addition, promissory estoppel' s did not apply because the
defendant could show no tangible detrimental reliance.' 9 He had simply
"form[edl the subjective intent to accept the offer and experience[d] whatever
expectations of benefit had been created by anticipation of its fulfillment."2
Affirming the utility of contract law analogies in plea bargaining disputes,
the court nevertheless concluded that Cooper's expectations merited constitu-
tional protection; the failure of a particular plea negotiation to satisfy the
standards of contract law should not preclude the defendant from claiming the
9. 594 F.2d at 16 n.5.
10. Id. When an offeree, acting on a reasonable belief arising from an offeror's words
or actions that an offer will not be revoked, relies to his detriment, the offeror may be
barred from revoking the offer. See generally 1 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 49-52 (1963).
11. Generally, a defendant has relied on a plea bargain to his detriment when he has
incriminated himself in some way; i.e., he has revealed damaging evidence or confessed.
12. Cooper claimed that the trial court improperly admitted into evidence a recording
of a telephone conversation in which he took part, and abused its discretion in failing to
sequester a witness during the testimony of other witnesses. 594 F.2d at 14.
13. Id. at 13.
14. Id. at 15 (citing Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971)).
15. 594 F.2d at 15-16. See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
16. 594 F.2d at 16.
17. Id.
18. See note 10 supra.
19. See note 11 supra.
20. 594 F.2d at 16.
1981]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
negotiation was constitutionally unfair.2 Simply put, the court held that a plea
bargain need not be contractually enforceable to be constitutionally enforceable.
It reasoned that contract law could not adequately define the limits of
constitutional rights because the goals of contract law and constitutional law
are dramatically different. Fairness under contract law merely requires
minimally equitable dealings at arm's length in the market place, as defined by
technical rules of economic and utilitarian origin. 22 Fairness in the constitution-
al sense, as defined by due process, is designed to protect the individual citizen
from the unjust acts of a powerful and unwieldy government.23 Therefore,
constitutional fairness is of necessity broader in scope and less technically
defined than contractual fairness. 24 Based on this reasoning, the court concluded
that "expectations reasonably formed [by the defendant] in reliance upon the
honor of the government in making and abiding by its proposals '25 deserved
constitutional protection even though those expectations did not amount to
contractual reliance.
26
The Fourth Circuit employed a circular three-step analysis in recognizing
that Cooper had a constitutional right to protection of his expectations. First,
the court identified the general sources of the constitutional right it recognized.
Second, it examined the facts in Cooper in light of these general constitutional
sources. Third, it subjected the right it recognized under those facts to a test of
constitutional reasonableness. 2
7
According to the court, the constitutional principles on which Cooper's right
was based were the fifth amendment right to due process and the sixth
21. Id. at 18.
22. The court stated that:
In quite general terms, analogies from contract law will usually provide a reliable
inclusive test for the existence of constitutional right and violation, but not an equally
reliable exclusive test. Conduct by government prosecutors that in the market place
would constitute breach of contract or give rise to promissory estoppel will practically
always reflect constitutionally unfair conduct in transactions between sovereign and
citizen in matters of liberty and punishment. But the obverse of this does not follow.
Just because the elements of express contract or promissory estoppel have not been
realized in particular plea negotiations cannot mean conclusively that there has been
no unfairness in the constitutional sense.
Id. at 17.
23. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Selikoffv. Comm'r of Correction, 524 F.2d 650, 654
(2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951 (1976) ("Contractl principles, borrowed from the
commercial world, are inapposite to the ends of criminal justice."); United States v.
Hughes, 223 F. Supp. 477, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), aff'd, 325 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1964) ("ITihe
Court will not be governed by the technical concept of 'promise' as used in contract law.");
State v. Brockman, 277 Md. 687, 697, 357 A.2d 376, 383 (1976) ("IRligid application of
contract law to plea negotiations would be incongruous."); People v. Reagan, 395 Mich.
306, 314, 235 N.W.2d 581, 585 (1975) ("The standards of commerce do not govern, and
should not govern, the administration of criminal justice.").
24. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 401 n.8 (1977).





amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.2 8 Concluding that the
defendant's fifth amendment right was "too plain to require discussion,"2 9 the
court concentrated on explaining the application of the sixth amendment. It
reasoned that the prosecutor is required to negotiate plea bargains with defense
counsel who must then report the results, including unfavorable ones, to the
defendant. Improper government retractions communicated through defense
counsel may not only erode the defendant's confidence in the honor of the
government, but in defense counsel's ability and performance as well. As a
result, defense counsel's effective assistance could be diminished.3 ° Applying
this reasoning to the facts in Cooper, the court held that "once presented, . . . a
[reasonable] proposal may not be withdrawn in the face of proffered acceptance
for no other reason than that a superior disagrees with an apparently
authorized subordinate's judgment in making it."'31 Finally, the court subjected
its conclusion to a test of constitutional reasonableness by weighing the
practical burdens that recognition of the right would place on the government
against the practical consequences that its nonrecognition would have for the
defendant.32 Reasoning that simple precautions by the government could protect
the defendant from abuse and instill public confidence in government adminis-
tration of justice, the court found that the right recognized was constitutionally
reasonable 33
In conclusion, the court held that the appropriate remedy for the breach of
Cooper's constitutional right was specific enforcement of the government's
proposal to the fullest extent possible. 4 The judgment was vacated and
remanded with instructions that the defendant be allowed to enter a plea of
guilty to one of the counts upon which he was convicted. If he did so, all
remaining counts would be dismissed, as the government had originally
proposed. If he failed to plead guilty to one count, his conviction on all four
counts would be reinstated. In addition, the defendant was relieved of any other
obligations he may have had under the original proposal. However, the
government was also relieved of any reciprocal obligations to recommend a
specific sentence. :5
28. Id. The court did not attempt to provide a general rule to be applied in similar
cases, but left the determination of when the right at issue arose to case-by-case
development.
29. Id. Specifically, the court referred to the right of "fundamental fairness"
encompassed in the substantive due process clause of the fifth amendment. See Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932).
30. 594 F.2d at 18-19.
31. Id. at 19.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 19-20.
34. The Fourth Circuit noted that the fact that the district court could have
objectively considered and rejected the plea proposal did not prohibit it from directing the
district court to enforce the proposal on remand. Id. at 20.
35. Id. at 20-21.
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JUDICIAL PROTECTION AGAINST BROKEN PLEA BARGAINS 36
Santobello v. New York
In the only Supreme Court case dealing squarely with the issue of broken
plea bargains, Santobello v. New York, 7 the Court recognized that plea
bargaining is an important aspect of the criminal justice system, and expressed
concern that the interest of the accused in the fair disposition of his case be
carefully protected." To safeguard that interest, the Court required that
promises or agreements made by a prosecutor which are part of the inducement
or consideration for a plea bargain be fulfilled. 9
In Santobello, the accused negotiated with the prosecutor, reaching the
agreement that the accused would withdraw his previous not guilty plea and
plead guilty to a lesser included offense in exchange for the prosecutor's promise
to make no recommendations as to sentence. When the accused appeared for
sentencing several months later, a new prosecutor who was unaware of his
predecessor's promise recommended the maximum sentence, which the judge
imposed. On appeal; the Court concluded that "the interests of justice and
appropriate recognition of the duties of the prosecution in relation to promises
made in the negotiation of pleas of guilty" required that the judgment be
vacated and the case remanded to the state court for further consideration as to
whether the circumstances required only that the promise be specifically
enforced or that the accused be allowed to withdraw his plea.4"
36. For an extensive coverage of the historial, social, philosophical and legal aspects
of the plea bargaining process, see 13 LAW & Soc'y REV. 197 (1979) (special issue devoted
entirely to plea bargaining). For a history of guilty pleas from tribal society to the present,
see Wishingood, The Plea Bargain in Historical Perspective, 23 BUFFALO L. REV. 499
(1974).
37. 404 U.S. 257 (1971). In Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), the Supreme
Court first stated that plea bargaining was a constitutionally proper practice. Id. at 753.
However, the Court noted that pleading guilty is a "grave and solemn act" which results
in a waiver of several constitutional rights; i.e., the right to a jury trial, the right to
confront one's accusers, and the right not to incriminate oneself. Id. at 748. Therefore, in
order to be constitutionally valid the plea must be entered voluntarily and intelligently. Id.
at 755-56. Although the Court in Santobello mentioned the Brady requirements that a
plea be "voluntary and knowing," 404 U.S. at 261, it based the defendant's right to relief
primarily on the "interests of justice." Id. at 262. Had the Santobello Court concluded that
the constitutional violation was that the plea was not "voluntary and knowing," it seems
the appropriate remedy would have been recission of the guilty plea, as it is unlikely a
defendant would wish to enforce an involuntary or unintelligent plea. In fact, defendant
Santobello specifically requested that he be granted a recission. The Court rejected this
request, concluding that the state court should decide whether the circumstances of the
case "require" specific performance by the government or "require" recission. Id. at 263.
Taking the implications of the Court's logic one step further, it seems that the primary
situation in which specific performance would be required to satisfy constitutional
standards would be when the defendant's expectations that the promise would be fulfilled
merit constitutional protection,
38. 404 U.S. 257, 260-61 (1971).
39. Id. at 262.
40. Id. at 262-63. See note 35 supra.
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Each of the seven Supreme Court justices who heard Santobello's argu-
ments concluded that he had a right to some remedy for the broken plea
bargain.4 The majority based its opinion on the well-settled principle that a
guilty plea must be voluntary and intelligent" and on the general "interests of
justice."' Although there was no specific statement that the opinion was
constitutionally grounded, the Court in Santobello was reviewing a state court
decision to which no federal statute applied. Therefore, unless its decision was
based on federal constitutional grounds, the Court would not have had
jurisdiction to reverse the state court below.4 4 Indeed, in his concurring opinion,
Justice Douglas clearly indicated that a "constitutional rule," apparently
stemming from due process, was applicable to the case."
However, the majority's failure to elaborate on the meaning of the
"interests of justice," as well as to identify and explain the constitutional basis
for its decision, has left the lower courts with little guidance when faced with a
broken plea bargain. If the particular facts involve an accepted offer which has
been relied upon by the defendant, as in Santobello, then the lower court need
look no further than the "interests of justice" to enforce the plea bargain. But
when the facts deviate from those in Santobello. as they do in Cooper. the court
is faced with the basic issue left unresolved by the Supreme Court: are the
"interests of justice," and the constitutional rights they imply, limited by the
general principles of contract law?
4
"
The Use of Contract Analogies in Defining Plea
Bargaining Rights
Some courts hold that a defendant's constitutional rights in the plea
bargaining process are coextensive with, and therefore defined by, analogous
contract rights.47 These courts do not recognize the agreement between the
41. Chief Justice Burger authored the majority opinion reversing the defendant's
conviction, and was joined by Justices Douglas, White, and Blackmun. Justice Douglas
also wrote a concurring opinion. Justice Marshall agreed with the decision to reverse, but
dissented from the decision to allow the state court to choose the proper remedy on
remand. Justices Brennan and Stewart joined the Marshall opinion.
42. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755-56 (1970). See note 37 supra.
43. 404 U.S. at 262. The Court also stated that the plea bargaining process must be
"attended by safeguards to insure the defendant what is reasonably due in the
circumstances." Id. Perhaps the Court was implying that its decision was based on due
process.
44. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976).
45. 404 U.S. at 267 (Douglas, J., concurring). Accord, Cooper v. United States, 594
F.2d 12 (1979). Contra, State v. Kuchenreuther, 218 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Iowa 1974) ("It is
also worthy of note that Santobello was not adjudicated on any constitutional ground but
rather by application of what may be termed a 'fair play standard.'").
46. See note 50 and accompanying text infra. For an extensive discussion of the
Supreme Court's opinion in Santobello, see Westen & Westin. A Constitutional Law of
Remedies for Broken Plea Bargains, 66 CAiLIF. L. Rrv. 471 (1978).
47. See, e.g.. Johnson v. Beto, 466 F.2d 478, 480 (5th Cir. 1972): Shields v. State. 374
A.2d 816, 820 (Del.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 893 (1977).
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defendant and the state as a bona fide contract governed by federal contract law,
but simply refer to the general principles of commercial contract law for
guidance. Courts which apply contract law analogies to plea bargaining
generally conclude that a defendant has no right to require enforcement of the
prosecutor's promise unless he has clearly accepted the offer, acted in reliance
upon the government's promise,48 and suffered measurable injury as a result of
its withdrawal.4 9 Even the Supreme Court has suggested that contract law
furnishes a ready framework in which to define the rights of the parties when a
plea bargain is broken by a prosecutor.
50
When using a contract analogy, most courts view the plea agreement as a
form of unilateral contract. 5' Therefore, the consideration the defendant gives
for the prosecutor's promise is not his promise to plead guilty, but the act of
pleading guilty itself. Although the prosecutor is under no obligation to perform
until the defendant performs, he has no right to compel the defendant's
48. See note 11 supra.
49. The following courts have scrutinized plea agreements under traditional contract
doctrines: Anderson v. Wainwright, 446 F. Supp. 763, 765 (M.D. Fla. 1978); State v. Rogel,
116 Ariz. 114, 116, 568 P.2d 421, 423 (1977) (en banc); Shepard v. State, 549 S.W.2d 550,
551 (Mo. App. 1977); State v. Collins, 300 N.C. 142, 265 S.E.2d 172 (1980). Courts have
also allowed prosecutors to withdraw from plea agreements where the defendant had not
yet relied on the promise to his detriment. State v. Reasbeck, 359 So.2d 564, 565 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1978); State v. Edwards, 279 N.W.2d 9 (Iowa 1979) (expressly rejecting the
Cooper decision); DeRusse v. State, 579 S.W.2d 224, 236 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) ("In the
absence of any showing of harm, we hold that the prosecutor's withdrawal from the plea
bargain agreement prior to the entry of a plea by appellant was not reversible error.").
In Cooper, defense counsel and the government framed the arguments in their
briefs in contractual terms. Defense counsel argued that "The Itriall Court failed to go
beyond the 'black letter' law of plea bargaining, and should have delved more deeply into
the law of contracts .... " Brief for Appellant at 15, Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12
(4th Cir. 1979). The government relied on the theory that the plea agreement was not
enforceable because the offer had been withdrawn before it was accepted or acted upon by
Cooper. Brief for Appellee at 18-19, Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1979).
50. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978); Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63,
75 n.6 (1977). However, the Court has not stated that contract law limits the rights of a
defendant. The question remains open because the Court has not been presented with a
situation in which a prosecutor broke a plea bargain which did not constitute a traditional
contract.
Note, however, that Santobello could have been decided on the basis that the
contract was breached, but the Court did not rely extensively on that analysis. Yet,
several lower courts have interpreted Santobello as relying on a contract analysis. See
United States v. Bridgeman, 523 F.2d 1099, 1109-10 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 961 (1976) ("Santobello ... involved fundamental principles of contract law."): State
v. Collins, 300 N.C. 142, 265 S.E.2d 172 (1980) (interpreted Santobello narrowly to allow
enforcement of a plea bargain when it took the form of a contract). See also Turner v. Fair,
476 F. Supp. 874, 879 (D. Mass. 1979) ("IThe witness seeking immunityl may be able to
enforce specific performance of the Commonwealth's promise . . . either according to a
contract theory ]citing Santobellol or according to fundamental notions of fairness
embodied in the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ]citing Cooperl . . . ").




performance. As a result, the prosecutor does not breach a contract if he rescinds
his offer before the defendant performs because the contract does not exist until
the defendant takes the promised action.
5 2
Other courts have completely rejected the application of contract analogies
to broken plea bargains. These courts have reasoned that the economic and
utilitarian standards used to evaluate arm's-length transactions in the business
world are not appropriate measures of the constitutional rights of a defendant
who is unable to deal at arm's length with the criminal justice system. 3
Although contract law will not protect expectations arising as a result of an
agreement between equal private parties unless the agreement has met
technical requirements, the agreement between a prosecutor and a defendant is
essentially different. The plea bargain is an agreement between the government
and a private individual which has the ultimate goal of advancing criminal
justice. 4 In contrast, the civilly enforced contract has as its goal fairness in the
market place as measured in economic and utilitarian terms. 55 If contract law
had as its goal promoting justice instead of commercial utility, the Cooper court
would probably have decided differently and held that constitutional rights were
only as broad as contract rights.
52. See Shields v. State, 374 A.2d 816, (Del.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 893 (1977): State
v. Edwards, 279 N.W.2d 9 (Iowa 1979); State v. Brockman, 277 Md. 687. 357 A.2d 376
(1976); State v. Collins, 300 N.C. 142, 265 S.E.2d 172 (1980).
Note that under the common law of contracts, an offeror can withdraw his offer if
he received no consideration for it, absent a claim of promissory estoppel. See generally 1
A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 38-51 (1963). However, the harshness of this doctrine is
gradually being softened. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89B(2) (Tent. Draft
Nos. 1-7, 1973) which states:
An offer which the offeror should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a
substantial character on the part of the offeree before acceptance and which does
induce such action or forbearance is binding as an option contract to the extent
necessary to avoid injustice.
Note also § 2-205 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which states that a merchant who
extends an offer and gives assurance that it will be held open for a stated (or reasonable)
time may not withdraw that offer for lack of consideration. Recall that the prosecutor in
Cooper represented in making the plea proposal that it would be held open for acceptance
for a week. Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12, 15 n.2 (4th Cir. 1979). Surely a criminal
defendant considering an offer to plea bargain which will affect his liberty and his future
deserves the same advantages enjoyed by a businessman contemplating an offer to
purchase goods.
53. See note 23 supra. In State v. Ashby, 81 N.J. Super. 350, 195 A.2d 635 (1963),
rev'd on other grounds, 43 N.J. 273, 204 A.2d 1 (1964), a dissenting judge argued that:
A pledge of public faith, and not the law of contracts, is the motivating factor in the
enforcement of these promises . . . - the practice of enforcing promises of immunity
stems from the common law recognition that one who gave evidence for the Crown
was possessed of an equitable title to a recommendation for mercy. Clearly, the
practice of enforcing such agreements could not, and did not in its inception, develop
from a contractual relationship between the Crown and the Crown witness.
81 N.J. Super. at 370, 195 A.2d at 643 (Goldman. J.. dissenting).
54. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971).
55. See notes 22 & 51 supra.
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Prior to Cooper, plea bargaining cases considered by the Fourth Circuit
involved situations in which the plea agreement was valid in contractual
terms.5 6 Therefore, the prosecutor breached an agreement which was enforce-
able under contract law and there was no need to find grounds defined purely in
constitutional terms for providing relief to the defendant.5 7 When faced with the
plea bargain in Cooper - a bargain which was not enforceable as a contract -
the Fourth Circuit accepted the use of contract analogies in plea bargaining
disputes but warned that "the temptation to take the relative certainties of
established common law analogies too far in developing difficult constitutional
doctrine is ever present and ever to be resisted. '5 8 The court concluded that the
fact that a particular plea bargain did not satisfy the mechanical application of
56. See United States v. Hammerman, 528 F.2d 326 (4th Cir. 1975); Harris v.
Superintendent, Virginia State Penitentiary, 518 F.2d 1173 (4th Cir. 1975) (the
prosecutor's failure to present the court with a recommendation as to sentence was held a
breach even though the court could not be bound by the recommendation); United States
v. Brown, 500 F.2d 375, 378 (4th Cir. 1974) (a prosecutor's halfhearted recommendation to
the court was held not sufficient to fulfill his promise to make a recommendation for the
defendant's benefit); United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426, 427-28 (4th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 933 (1974) (a defendant's detrimental reliance upon a plea bargain and
the prosecutor's subsequent breach were grounds for the dismissal of an indictment).
57. Thus, until it decided Cooper, the Fourth Circuit was in the same position as the
Supreme Court; i.e., it had not stated that the defendant's rights were limited by the
principles of contract law but the need to venture beyond a contractual analysis had not
arisen. See note 50 supra.
58. 594 F.2d at 17. The court found support for its statements in Brewer v. Williams,
430 U.S. 387, 401 n.8 (1977) ("[Wle do not deal here with notions of offer, acceptance,
consideration, or other concepts of the law of contracts. We deal with constitutional law.").
Few courts before Cooper accepted the use of contract analogies while also
recognizing the limits of such reasoning. In State v. Brockman, 277 Md. 687, 357 A.2d 376
(1976), the court stated:
The standard to be applied to plea negotiations is one of fair play and equity under the
facts and circumstances of the case, which, although entailing certain contract
concepts, is to be distinguished from what the State appears to advocate, the strict
application of the common law principles of contracts.
Id. at 697, 357 A.2d at 382-83 (citing Santobello).
The Brockman court also stated in dicta that "a defendant may sometimes be
entitled to enforcement of his plea bargain even though he has not yet entered the
confession of guilt he promised to make." Id. at 695-96, 357 A.2d at 382. The facts in
Cooper go one step beyond the Brockman hypothetical, since Cooper not only had not
entered a guilty plea, but had not even had a chance to convey a promise that he would.
The Fourth Circuit further explained its reasoning in United States v. McIntosh,
612 F.2d 835 (4th Cir. 1979). Discussing its decision in Cooper. the court stated:
Contrary to appellant's argument, Cooper does not shun fundamental contract and
agency principles where the content and validity of the plea bargain is at issue . ...
With predictability and reliance as the foundation of plea bargaining itself, we must
apply fundamental contract and agency principles to plea bargains as the best means
to fair enforcement of the parties' agreed obligations. Where, such as in Cooper. some
technical rule works directly to impair a defendant's personal acceptance of an offer
and deny a substantial right such as effective assistance of counsel, we will




the law of contracts did not mean there had been no constitutional violation.59
Clearly, the Cooper court would acknowledge that courts using contract
analogies to the benefit of defendant are consistent with its holding. It is only
those cases which rely upon contract law to deny the defendant recovery which
are inconsistent with Cooper, and then only to the extent that there exists a
constitutional right of broader scope than the contractual one.60
The Interests of Justice In Reviewing Plea Bargains
Although Santobello could have been decided on contract principles alone, 6
1
the Supreme Court chose instead to consider the "interests of justice, 62 an
approach which implies the use of constitutional principles.
A line of cases beginning in 1899 with Commonwealth v. Saint John63
analyzed agreements between prosecutors and defendants in terms of the
interests of justice and the importance of public faith in the criminal justice
system.64 The tone of these cases indicated that the defendant should be
provided relief when government officials act improperly, in order to punish
those officials for injuring the integrity of the criminal justice system and for
compromising the high standards to which the government is held by its
citizens. Damage to the individual defendant's constitutional rights either was
not discussed or was mentioned only in terms of damage to society as a whole. 65
59. 594 F.2d at 18.
60. See United States ex rel. Selikoff v. Comm'r of Corrections, 524 F.2d 650 (2d Cir.
1975), in which the defendant asked that the principles of contract law, namely strict
application of specific performance, be imposed on the plea bargain he entered. The court
held that due process did not require the remedy of specific performance under the
circumstances. It is unclear how Cooper would deal with a situation in which the
defendant would receive greater protection under contract law than he would under
constitutional law.
61. In Santobello, an offer had been made and accepted and the defendant had
entered a guilty plea in reliance upon the resulting agreement. Therefore, an enforceable
contract existed and the prosecutor's failure to perform resulted in a breach of that
contract. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
62. Id. at 262.
63. 173 Mass. 566, 54 N.E. 254 (1899).
64. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 188 So.2d 24, 27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966) ("This was a
pledge of the public faith - a promise made by state officials - and one that should not be
lightly disregarded."); Sturgis v. State, 25 Md. App. 628, 637, 336 A.2d 803. 807 (1975)
(the failure of the prosecutor to keep his promises "rendered valueless the State's word,
landl he effectively eroded the accused's trust in the integrity of the State."): State v.
Ward, 112 W. Va. 552, 554, 165 S.E. 803, 804-05 (1932) ("The courts treat such promises
[made by prosecutors] as pledges of the public faith.").
65. See, e.g., In re Doe, 410 F. Supp. 1163, 1166 (E.D. Mich. 1976) ("Neither may the
government insist that Doe demonstrate some prejudice before claiming a violation of his
rights in the government's broken promise. No prejudice, apart from that suffered by the
administration of justice, was apparent in Santobello.". See also Note. Criminal Law -
Binding Effect of Prosecutor's Agreement to Dismiss Prosecution, 23 WAYNE L. RE:v. 1129,
1140 n.41 (1977). The Fourth Circuit in Cooper devoted a part of its opinion to a similar
theory. 594 F.2d at 20. But see Government's Petition for Rehearing at § 2. United States
19811
100 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 40
Therefore, on the surface, these cases do not provide a constitutional basis for
relief when plea bargains are reneged.66
However, the "public faith" line of cases is not constitutionally irrelevant.
The Cooper court used similar reasoning to conclude that "failure to find
constitutional right and violation in this case would necessarily give judicial
approval to a practice whose possibilities for easy abuse, or at least the
appearance of abuse, are abundantly clear."6 The above language of the court
implies that the defendant has a constitutional right defined in negative terms
- the right to be free of governmental negligence or abuse. A right of this
nature, though it generally benefits the individual defendant, is actually
tailored to benefit the general public by attacking a deficiency in the judicial
system itself.68 Therefore, the "public interest" does receive the benefit of
constitutional protection as long as it is embodied in the rights of an individual
defendant.
In light of the limited control of the defendant over his fate in the criminal
justice system, the government has been held to high standards in exercising its
considerable power.69 The Seventh Circuit recently stated that "both to protect
the plea bargaining defendant from overreaching by the prosecutor and to
insure the integrity of the plea bargaining process, the 'most meticulous
v. Cooper, 594 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1979), where the government used the "public faith"
analysis to argue that "the [trial] Court should not focus solely on the defendant's
interests, but also on the substantial social interests that correction of a government
mistake would protect." Id. The government was attempting to balance the benefit of
allowing the government to remedy its errors against the benefit of encouraging
defendants to enter plea negotiations.
66. The Bill of Rights protects the interests of individual persons by creating rights
personal to them. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818-21 (1975).
67. 594 F.2d at 20. However, the court in Cooper was careful to note there was no
evidence of intentional abuse by the government.
See also Westen & Westin, A Constitutional Law of Remedies for Broken Plea
Bargains, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 471, 521 (1978) ("[I1n the area of broken plea agreements, due
process is concerned with more than redressing personal injuries to the defendant; it is
also concerned with deterring acts of bad faith by the state.").
68. The exclusionary rule, which prevents the use by the government in a criminal
prosecution of evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution, is a clear example of a
constitutional remedy based in large part on "public interest." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961). Although the exclusionary rule protects individual defendants, a major reason for
its development was to deter improper police conduct in the interest of society as a whole.
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). However, the exclusionary rule is a constitutional
remedy which is applied only after some other constitutional right, such as the fourth
amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, has been violated.
The Court in Mapp concluded that the purpose of the exclusionary rule was "to compel
respect for the constitutional guarantee in the only effectively available way - by
removing the incentive to disregard it." 367 U.S. at 656.
69. Although contract law provides several doctrines intended to mitigate the effects
of unequal bargaining power between parties (e.g., theories of unconscionability, contracts
of adhesion, construction of ambiguous terms against one who drafted the contract), the
stakes are economic in nature. Such doctrines are not sufficient to protect a defendant's
interest in life and liberty.
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standards of both promise and performance must be met by prosecutors
engaging in plea bargaining.'"70 United States v. Brown71 illustrates the
meticulous standards which must be met by plea bargaining prosecutors in the
Fourth Circuit. In Brown, a prosecutor unenthusiastically repeated the sentenc-
ing recommendation which he was bound by the plea agreement to make. The
court found that he had not fulfilled that agreement because he had not
presented his recommendation with the encouragement and advocacy required
by the bargain.
7 2
THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR THE COOPER DECISION
Many state and lower federal courts have recognized that the most logical
way to shield both the general public and the individual defendant from
governmental negligence or abuse is to give constitutional protection to the
reasonable expectations that the defendant develops as a result of his dealings
with the government.7 3 In Cooper, the Fourth Circuit held that in certain
circumstances the mere formation of reasonable expectations in reliance upon
the honor of the government in making and keeping its promises was sufficient
70. United States v. Bowler, 585 F.2d 851, 854 (7th Cir. 1978). See also Palermo v.
Warden, Green Haven State Prison, 545 F.2d 286, 297 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 431
U.S. 911 (1977); Geisser v. United States, 513 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1975); Correale v. United
States, 479 F.2d 944, 947 (1st Cir. 1973).
72. Therefore, although the prosecutor had technically fulfilled the terms of the
contract by making the recommendation, the court went beyond the standards of contract
law to scrutinize the prosecutor's actions more closely and found he had breached the
agreement.
71. 500 F.2d 375 (4th Cir. 1974). See also State v. Johnson, 23 Wash. App. 490, 596
P.2d 308 (1979), where the defendant entered into a plea bargain in which he agreed to
supply information about other suspects if the prosecutor would drop one of the charges
against him. The defendant was not given an opportunity to see an attorney while he was
in custody on several charges and refused to supply the information he had promised until
he saw an attorney. The prosecutor decided that the defendant had breached his
agreement to provide information and brought him to trial on the charge which was to be
dropped under the plea agreement. The court upheld the agreement, stating that,
"[allthough there may have been a technical breach by the defendant, at best it was not
substantial enough to justify releasing the prosecutor from his part of the bargain at least
without express notice" that the defendant must provide the information even absent
counsel. Id. at 498-99, 596 P.2d at 312. In reaching its decision, the court relied on
Cooper, giving it a very favorable reception.
73. See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 61 N.J. 314, 320, 294 A.2d 57, 60 (1972) (essential
fairness requires that the defendant's expectations be protected); Commonwealth v.
Zakrzewski, 460 Pa. 528, 533, 333 A.2d 898, 900 (1975) ("It is settled that where a plea
bargain has been entered into and is violated by the Commonwealth, the defendant is
entitled, at the least, to the benefit of the bargain.").
Several courts have interpreted Santobello as implying constitutional authority
for the protection of the defendant's expectation interests. State v. Thomas, 61 N.J. 314,
294 A.2d 57 (1972); Commonwealth v. Zakrzewski, 460 Pa. 528, 333 A.2d 898 (1975); State
v. Tourtellotte, 88 Wash.2d 579, 564 P.2d 799 (1977). This inference may be based on the
Supreme Court's conclusion that the state court must decide "whether the circumstances
of this case require only that there be specific performance of the agreement on the plea
1981]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
to trigger a constitutional right.74 The court did not explain what would
constitute appropriate circumstances, but it did state that the constitutional
right clearly arose under the circumstances in Cooper.7 ' Although the Cooper
court could have avoided deciding a constitutional question by construing the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure7 6 or exercising its discretionary power over
inferior federal courts,7 it chose to base its decision on the fifth amendment due
process guarantee 78 and the sixth amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel.79
.. or ... the circumstances require granting the relief sought by Ithe defendantl, i.e.,
the opportunity to withdraw his plea of guilty." 404 U.S. at 263.
In the purely contractual setting, specific performance is ordered as relief for a
broken bargain only if there is no adequate remedy in damages at law. See 5A A. CORBIN,
CONTRACTS § 1136 (1964). Since the injury caused to the defendant's reasonable
expectations cannot be adequately measured in monetary terms, only specific performance
will suffice to protect the defendant's interest. See Stewart v. Cupp, 12 Or. App. 167, 173,
506 P.2d 503, 506-07 (1973). However, if circumstances have changed so drastically that
performance of the bargain would not benefit the defendant, he may be allowed to
withdraw his plea. Cooper could not have been given the option of withdrawing a guilty
plea because he never entered one. See In re 1972 Dodge Van, 24 Ariz. App. 337, 538 P.2d
766 (1975); State ex rel. Gutierrez v. Baker, 276 So.2d 470, 472 (Fla. 1973); Spalding v.
State, 330 N.E.2d 774, 778 (Ind. App. 19751; State v. Brockman, 277 Md. 687, 357 A.2d
376 (1976); People v. DeWolfe, 36 A.2d 618, 318 N.Y.S.2d 810 (1971); Stewart v. Cupp, 12
Or. App. 167, 173, 506 P.2d 503, 506 (1973); Commonwealth v. Zuber, 466 Pa. 453,
457-62, 353 A.2d 441, 444-46 (1976); State v. Freeman, 115 R.I. 523, 532-34, 351 A.2d
824, 829-30 (1976); State v. Tourtellotte, 88 Wash.2d 579, 564 P.2d 799, 803 (1977).
74. 594 F.2d at 18.
75. These circumstances were outlined by the court in an attempt to keep its holding
as narrow as possible. The court found it crucial that:
1. the proposal was specific and unambiguous in form;
2. the proposal was made without any reservation related to a superior's approval or
otherwise;
3. the proposal was reasonable in content;
4. the proposal was made by a prosecutor with apparent (and probably actual)
authority;
5. the proposal was promptly communicated to the defendant;
6. the defendant assented promptly and unequivocally to the terms of the proposal;
7. the defendant indicated his assent to his counsel;
8. the defendant was entitled to assume the communication of his assent to the
government would consummate the plea agreement;
9. the defense counsel promptly communicated defendant's acceptance to the
government, although by chance the government's withdrawal was voiced before the
defendant's acceptance;
10. the reason for the attempted withdrawal had nothing to do with extenuating
circumstances affecting the government's or any public interest that was unknown
when the offer was made.
Id. at 19.
76. FED. R. CRiM. P. 11 forbids unreasonable revocation of plea offers.
77. The Fourth Circuit could have imposed a standard of fairness which was not
constitutionally based on the lower federal courts under its control.
78. "No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law ...." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
79. "In all criminal proceedings, the accused shall enjoy the right ...to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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The Fifth Amendment Due Process Guarantee
Stating that the fifth amendment right to fundamental fairness and
substantive due process is "too plain to require discussion,"" ° the court discarded
an opportunity to clarify its reasoning and to provide support for its recognition
of a constitutional right which protected the defendant's expectations. The
court's failure to rely on prior cases recognizing constitutional protection of
expectations arising in connection with plea negotiations is surprising.
However, prior cases recognizing expectation interests involved situations in
which the defendant had already entered a plea, revealed evidence, or
completed some other act in reliance on the prosecutor's promise.8 Therefore,
the defendant's expectations had been acted upon and were arguably more
deserving of constitutional protection than the expectations Cooper harbored for
an afternoon but had no chance to act upon.
The Fourth Circuit commented in Cooper that other expectations formed by
criminal defendants are constitutionally protected, yet it failed to draw any
helpful analogies between those expectations and the expectations it
recognized."2 For example, the fifth amendment right to protection against
double jeopardy shields the expectations of finality that defendants form as a
result of trial and conviction by the state.8 3 These state-created expectations
merit constitutional protection to spare the defendant the substantive unfair-
ness of uncertainty regarding his fate in the criminal justice system.84 It is
reasonable to conclude that state-created expectations of finality reasonably
arising as a result of plea negotiations which are also intended to decide the
defendant's fate deserve similar protection under the due process clause.8 5
80. 594 F.2d at 18. See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
81. See note 72 and accompanying text supra.
82. 594 F.2d at 18 n.8.
83. The defendant reasonably expects that once a trial is begun against him his fate
will be decided and the trial will not be stopped and later begun again. Illinois v.
Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 471 (1973). He also expects that the sentence will not later be
increased. United States v. Turner, 518 F.2d 14, 15 (7th Cir. 1975).
84. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957) ("The State with all its resources
and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an
alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense, and ordeal and
compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity ... .").
85. However, the fact that the trial judge is not bound to accept the plea bargain
renders the bargain less "final" than a trial. The judge may reject the bargain and order a
different resolution of the charge against the defendant. See also United States v. Hallam,
472 F.2d 168 (9th Cir. 1973), in which the Ninth Circuit protected a defendant's interest in
the finality of a plea agreement. However, unlike the situation in Cooper, the agreement
in Hallam had already been performed by both the defendant and the government.
Note that only reasonable expectations are considered deserving of constitutional
protection. Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12, 17 (4th Cir. 1979). Cooper does not define
the term "reasonable," leaving the development of the constitutional right it recognized to
a case-by-case analysis of individual facts and circumstances. Id. at 18. See United States
v. Soc'y of Independent Gasoline Marketers, 624 F.2d 461 (4th Cir. 1979) (relying on
Cooper to hold that defendant's expectations were reasonable when prosecutor with both
actual and apparent authority repeatedly assured defendant of immunity from prosecu-
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In Virgin Islands v. Scotland,s6 the Third Circuit rejected the Cooper court's
application of the fifth amendment because it interfered with prosecutorial
discretion." The Scotland court agreed that constitutional standards required
more than the use of contract principles when reviewing plea bargains and that
the government should not necessarily have the right to withdraw from a plea
agreement. Yet, it concluded that "binding the prosecutor to his original plea
does interfere with his discretionary functions; i.e., determining what he feels is
fairest in light of the defendant's circumstances, the government's resources,
and the statute involved."8s Thus, the Third Circuit placed less weight on the
abuse or appearance of abuse which could arise from accepting poor government
conduct than did the Fourth Circuit.8 9
The Sixth Amendment Right to Effective
Assistance of Counsel
In Cooper, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the government's withdrawal
of its plea offer deprived the defendant of his sixth amendment right to the
effective assistance of counsel.90 The Cooper court reasoned that because
tion); United States v. McIntosh, 612 F.2d 835 (4th Cir. 1979) (relying on Cooper to hold
that defendant's expectations were unreasonable when based on the offer of a state
prosecutor with no real or apparent authority to promise immunity from federal
prosecution). See also notes 123 to 143 and accompanying text infra. See generally Reich,
The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) (arguing that once the government has created
rights for the individual in money, benefits, services, or contracts, these rights may not be
taken away without due process).
86. 614 F.2d 360 (3d Cir. 1980). In Scotland, a defendant was offered a plea bargain
which simply required him to plead guilty to certain counts. However, he was told that the
government's position with respect to a sentencing recommendation would depend on his
willingness to testify against a co-defendant. The defendant agreed to plead guilty to
several counts but did not agree to testify for the government. Upon learning of the partial
acceptance, the government attorney added another condition to the bargain; the
government would renege unless the bargaining defendant agreed to make a sworn
statement that his earlier statement to the police, implicating his co-defendant, was true.
The defendant moved the district court to order specific performance of the initial plea
agreement. The district court concluded the plea of guilty was never officially entered,
that the defendant had no remedy even though the government had engaged in bad
conduct, and that the defendant had had a trial which fairly decided the issues. The Third
Circuit affirmed, rejecting the reasoning in Cooper. Id. at 361-62.
87. Id. at 364. The Third Circuit relied upon Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357,
365 (1978), in which the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor who warned a defendant
that he would be charged with the stiffer offense of habitual criminality if he did not plead
guilty, and who did so charge that defendant, did not violate due process. 614 F.2d at 364
n.13.
88. 614 F.2d at 364.
89. See note 67 and accompanying text supra.
90. 594 F.2d 12, 18-19 (4th Cir. 1979). The Constitution itself does not state that the
assistance must be effective: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The
term was first used in Justice Sutherland's opinion in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71
(1932) (The defendant must be provided an attorney under circumstances which will not
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prosecutors must conduct plea negotiations through defense counsel,91 it is
defense counsel who must deliver news of the plea discussions to the defendant.
Any attempts by the government to withdraw an offer through defense counsel
affects not only the defendant's trust in the integrity of the government but his
confidence in his counsel's competency and professional responsibility as well.
As a result, the effectiveness of defense counsel's assistance is jeopardized. In
Brewer v. Williams,92 the Supreme Court intimated that the defendant's
effective representation by counsel may be harmed by the prosecutor's dishonor
of a promise he made to defense counsel.93 The District Court of New York took
this reasoning one step further in United States ex rel. Davis v. McMann94 and
concluded that a defendant should have complete confidence in his counsel to
benefit most fully from counsel's advice.
95
hinder his ability to receive "effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case."). The
term was explained in People v. Gonzalez, 47 N.Y.2d 606, 393 N.E.2d 987 (1979), in which
the court held that effective assistance of counsel means more than just having a law
school graduate go through the motions of representing a defendant; it requires the work
of single-minded counsel in researching law and gathering arguments on the defendant's
behalf so that he is afforded the protection an active advocate can provide. In McMann v.
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970), the Supreme Court held that a defendant who
contemplated pleading guilty to a felony charge had a sixth amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel. An attorney was considered effective if his advice was within the
range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Id. at 770-71. See also State
v. Johnson, 23 Wash. App. 490, 596 P.2d 308 (1979), in which a bargain was upheld
because it was not reasonable to expect a defendant who was rightfully demanding the
assistance of counsel before performing his part of the bargain to know that "if he didn't
unequivocally consent to talk without counsel that the deal was off ...." Id. at 312.
91. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(1). States are not affected by this requirement and may still
allow prosecutors to negotiate directly with defendants.
92. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
93. In his concurring opinion in Brewer v. Williams, Justice Stevens stated:
At this stage [custodial interrogation of a defendant] - as in countless others in
which the law profoundly affects the life of the individual - the lawyer is the
essential medium through which the demands and commitments of the sovereign are
communicated to the citizens. If, in the long run, we are seriously concerned about the
individual's effective representation by counsel, the State cannot be permitted to
dishonor its promise [that interrogation would not take place in counsel's absencel to
[defendant's] lawyer.
Id. at 415 (Stevens, J., concurring). The Cooper court cited with approval the above
statement by Justice Stevens. 594 F.2d at 18.
94. 252 F. Supp. 539 (N.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 386 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 958(1968).
95. Id. at 545. However, court appointment of counsel deemed competent by the court
and legal community will satisfy the indigent defendant's right to effective assistance of
counsel. Wallace v. McDonald, 369 F. Supp. 180 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); People v. Pope, 23 Cal.3d
412, 590 P.2d 859, 152 Cal. Rptr. 732 (1979). The indigent defendant has no absolute right
to any particular counsel of his choice. State v. Cunningham, 23 Wash. App. 826, 598 P.2d
756 (1979), rev'd on other grounds, 93 Wash.2d 823, 613 P.2d 1139 (1980); State v.
Scarbrough, 55 Wis.2d 181, 197 N.W.2d 790 (1972). This implies that the defendant's
personal relationship with his attorney is not as important as the objective ability of that
attorney to represent him. However, this policy of denying the indigent defendant his
choice of a particular attorney may be an attempt by the government to provide the
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Clearly, a defendant has no constitutionally protected right to have
confidence in his attorney per se. 96 However, the Fourth Circuit in Cooper
intimated that if the defendant's lack of confidence in his attorney becomes so
extreme that he refuses to cooperate with or confide in that attorney, the
effectiveness of that attorney's assistance will be diminished, perhaps to the
point where it no longer meets the mandate of the sixth amendment. The court
implied that this is the result when competent counsel reaches a bargain
beneficial to the defendant, retains no control over the government's actions,
suffers government withdrawal of the bargain, and breaks the news to the
defendant who often does not personally attend the plea negotiations.9 7 As a
result, the court reasoned that the defendant may have difficulty distinguishing
the acts of the government from the acts of defense counsel, and may conclude
that his counsel is incompetent.98
Because it lacked solid precedent for its application of the sixth amendment,
the court in Cooper relied on the practical ramifications of withdrawal such as
the possibility of prosecutorial abuse. Although it is the prosecutor's goal to do
justice rather than gain a victim, 99 in practice most prosecutors must also be
concerned with winning cases, or at least disposing of them quickly. Conse-
defendant with due process but deny him the opportunity to obstruct justice by repeated
and unfounded rejection of competent court-appointed counsel. See Maynard v. Meachum,
545 F.2d 273 (1st Cir. 1976) (an indigent defendant's rejection of an appointed attorney
because he wished for another specific lawyer or he disagreed over trial tactics was not
sufficient to constitutionally require the court to appoint alternative counsel); Ennis v.
LeFevre, 424 F. Supp. 14 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 560 F.2d 1072 (2d Cir. 1977); State v.
Renshaw, 276 Md. 259, 347 A.2d 219 (1975) (a trial court could properly deny a
defendant's request for appointment of new counsel where the trial court's inquiry into the
request revealed that the defendant was adequately represented by his present counsel).
The Davis court stated that a defendant was entitled to a continuance when he
obtained new counsel so that confidence in that counsel could be developed. However,
several courts have refused to remove appointed attorneys where the defendant has
claimed he lacked confidence in his counsel. United States v. Johnson, 585 F.2d 374 (8th
Cir. 1978); State v. Sweezy, 291 N.C. 366, 230 S.E.2d 524 (1976). See generally Bazelon,
The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 CIN. L. REV. 1 (1973).
96. See note 95 supra.
97. For example, Cooper was unable to take part in the plea negotiations because he
was incarcerated at the time they took place. 594 F.2d at 15. Therefore, Cooper was forced
to rely entirely on his counsel's competence and no doubt attributed the result of those
negotiations to his counsel. The court noted that Cooper replaced the defense counsel who
handled the unsuccessful plea negotiations. Id. at 19 n.9.
But see United States v. Becklean, 598 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1979), in which the
defendants claimed that they should be allowed to withdraw their guilty pleas because of
their counsel's mistaken representation to them of the prosecutor's promise. The court
held that the defendant's impression of the bargain did not play a significant part in
motivating their guilty pleas and denied their motions. The court did not analyze the
bargain in contractual or constitutional terms, but applied instead what resembled a
harmless error doctrine.
98. The Fourth Circuit reaffirmed this conclusion in United States v. McIntosh, 612
F.2d 835 (4th Cir. 1979), interpreting Cooper.
99. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
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quently, a prosecutor may not carefully consider the side effects his plea
bargaining practices have on defendants. Even worse, the prosecutor could be
acutely aware of the adverse effects his withdrawal will have on a defendant
and use it to his advantage.100 Although the defendant may not suffer a
constitutional violation when he loses confidence in his attorney because of a
disagreement confined to the attorney-client relationship,10' a constitutional
violation may be recognized when the defendant's lack of confidence and
resulting failure to cooperate or communicate with his counsel arises from an
improper act by a government official which interferes with the attorney-client
relationship. 102
In Virgin Islands v. Scotland,I03 the Third Circuit rejected the sixth
amendment right recognized in Cooper. The Scotland court held that a
defendant who loses faith in his attorney when plea negotiations take an
unfavorable turn is not denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel
unless he has relied to his detriment on those negotiations. I° ' The court
reasoned that the defendant could lose faith in his attorney not only because the
government withdrew a plea proposal, but because it failed to offer a plea
proposal or offered only an unfavorable one.
10 5
100. Generally, both prosecutors and defense counsel who make unauthorized offers or
renege on promises not only cause harm to the defendant, but also limit their professional
effectiveness and adversely impact judicial proceedings. See generally ABA Standards
Relating to the Prosecution Function, §§ 4.1-4.3 (App. Draft 1971).
101. See note 95 supra which discusses the defendant's confidence as a result of his
direct relationship with his counsel.
102. In United States v. McIntosh, 612 F.2d 835 (4th Cir. 1979), the Fourth Circuit
faced a claim of sixth amendment violation based on its decision in Cooper. The appellant
in McIntosh testified his attorney had "guaranteed" to him that he would not be
prosecuted in federal court if he agreed to plea bargain in the state court, although there
was no evidence that a promise had been made. In addition, defense counsel neither
inquired whether federal charges could arise from their client's plea in state court, nor
whether the state prosecutor had the authority to bind the federal officials. Clearly, the
ineffective assistance of counsel displayed in McIntosh emanated from the carelessness of
defense counsel and not from any act by the government. It did not fall within the
reasoning of Cooper, which discussed only ineffective assistance of counsel which resulted
from an act of the government.
103. 614 F.2d 360 (3d Cir. 1980).
104. Id. at 363.
105. The Third Circuit reasoned that under Cooper, the prosecutor had made his offer
without any reservation depending on a superior's approval. If the prosecutor had made
the proposal conditional, the defense counsel would have had a duty to inform his client of
that condition. Therefore, there would be no claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
based on government withdrawal once the defendant knew of the contingency. As a result,
prosecutors in the Fourth Circuit will make all of their offers conditional. If the condition
alone does not satisfy Cooper, a court may then inquire whether the condition which the
prosecutor claims is legitimate or simply an attempt to avoid the Cooper holding. The
court in Scotland concluded that such an inquiry would be an invasion of prosecutorial
discretion. 614 F.2d at 364-65.
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The Test of Constitutional Reasonableness
In concluding its analysis, the Fourth Circuit made clear that the
constitutional right it recognized in Cooper was temperate in scope. 10 6 Noting
that the "defendant's constitutional entitlement here is only to that process
'reasonably due' under the circumstances,"'0 v the court applied a test of
constitutional reasonableness by weighing the burdens which recognition of the
right would place on the government against the consequences which denial of
the right would have for the defendant.10 8 The court concluded that recognition
of the right was reasonable on two grounds. First, simple precautions on the
part of the government could readily safeguard the right without endangering
any valid governmental or public interest in plea bargaining.0 9 Second, failure
to recognize a constitutional right would give judicial approval to plea
bargaining practices open to easy abuse, or at least the appearance of abuse." 0
The court also noted that recognition of the right would protect public interest
in the fair and efficient administration of justice."'
The Cooper court recognized the ramifications of plea bargaining beyond
the interests of a particular defendant and prosecutor. Although plea bargaining
is not unanimously approved by the courts, it is generally recognized as a
reasonable way to relieve the extreme burden placed on the criminal justice
system." 2 However, should there be any reason to question the seriousness and
106. The court specifically listed those facts on which its finding of constitutional
violation was based "in order to confine [its] holding as narrowly as liti may for decision."
594 F.2d at 19. These facts are outlined in note 74 supra.
107. 594 F.2d at 19 (citing Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971)). See also
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
108. 594 F.2d at 19.
109. Id. The court concluded that the government should be more specific about the
proposals made and the authority of the persons making them. It stated that consideration
of such procedures as signed memoranda with incorporated reservations relating to higher
approval were mandated by the systematic judicial scrutiny of plea bargaining practices
under FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e).
See also United States v. Fischetti, 475 F. Supp. 1145 (D. N.J. 1979), in which the
District Court of New Jersey noted that a controversy about a plea agreement would not
have arisen had an experimental written plea agreement form been used:
The use of the written forms will be required for the very reasons pointed out by
the Cooper court, . . . where it emphasized the importance of employing routine
requirements of signed memoranda as a simple and obvious tool to provide certainty
and avoid controversy. Important transactions such as property contracts, deeds,
mortgages and wills have long been required to be put in writing. Agreements in
respect to pleas affecting a person's constitutional rights and liberty are hardly of
lesser importance.
Id. at 1151.
110. 594 F.2d at 20.
111. Id.
112. See Note, The Legitimation of Plea Bargaining: Remedies for Broken Promises, 11
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 771, 772-74 (1973). See also Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260
(1971) ("The disposition of criminal charges by agreement between the prosecutor and the
accused, sometimes loosely called 'plea bargaining,' is an essential component of the
administration of justice. Properly administered, it is to be encouraged. If every criminal
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reliability of state-negotiated pleas, defendants will be wary of entering
negotiations and judges will be disinclined to sanction the process." 3
REMEDY
In Cooper, the Fourth Circuit summarily concluded that "specific enforce-
ment of the plea proposal, to the extent ... now possible" was necessary to
correct the constitutional error it recognized.' 14 Because the circumstances had
changed since the district court declined to enforce the proposal, the court
determined that only approximate enforcement" 5 of the specific plea entered
charge were subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government would
need to multiply by many times the number of judges and court facilities.").
113. See Westen & Westin, A Constitutional Law of Remedies for Broken Plea
Bargains, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 471,512 (1978).
114. 594 F.2d at 20. The court also stated that:
The status quo ante can obviously not now be reconstructed to permit the district court
objectively to consider under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e) whether on the facts then
subsisting the proposed plea agreement should be accepted. That it could have done so
in the first instance and in the process rejected the proposal does not now inhibit us in
directing enforcement on remand.
Id. (citations omitted).
When molding a constitutional remedy, a court cannot create whatever relief it
wishes; it must instead see that the remedy provided does not surpass what is required to
protect the specific constitutional right at issue. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971). However, it can be argued that constitutional remedies such
as the exclusionary rule are broader than is necessary to safeguard the defendant's
constitutional rights in an effort to restrain improper governmental action.
Where the right at issue is the defendant's interest in protecting his reasonably
formed expectations, specific performance or its equivalent is a sufficient remedy, as it
results in the enforcement of those expectations. For example, in State v. Tourtellotte, 88
Wash.2d 579, 564 P.2d 799 (1977), the lower court granted the defendant recission as a
remedy for a broken plea agreement because it restored him to the position he was in
before entering his plea. The defendant appealed, arguing that recission was inadequate
because it denied him the benefit of the state's promise. The Washington Supreme Court
granted the defendant specific performance because it was the only remedy which
protected the expectations the defendant formed on the basis of the state's promise. 88
Wash.2d at 585, 564 P.2d at 803. In United States v. Runck, 601 F.2d 968 (8th Cir. 1979),
the defendant entered a plea agreement in which he was subject to a certain number of
years imprisonment and a limited fine. However, the lower court judge imposed a sentence
which included placing Runck on probation, a condition of the probation being that Runck
make restitution for the money he fraudulently received. The restitution involved a large
sum of money. The Eighth Circuit held that a plea bargain limits the discretion of a
sentencing judge because the expectations of the parties to the bargain should not be
materially altered. Id. at 970. As a result of the addition of restitution, the sentence
imposed was not in conformity with the negotiated plea agreements or with the
defendant's expectations. See also note 72 supra.
115. In Correale v. United States, 479 F.2d 944, 950 (1st Cir. 1973), where the facts
were such that specific performance was no longer feasible, the court "approximated" the
relief the defendant would have received if the state had kept its promise, even though it
put the defendant in a more favorable position than he would have been in if the promise
had originally been kept. But see Westen & Westin, A Constitutional Law of Remedies For
1981]
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could be achieved.116 Arguably, specific performance requiring the government
to present its sentencing recommendations as originally proposed would have
best protected Cooper's legitimate expectations regarding what he was due in
the original negotiations.1 17 Under this analysis, it should not matter that
Cooper was unable to perform his part of the bargain in full because his
inability to do so, due to changed circumstances, was a direct result of the
government's breach of negotiations and no fault of his own.
Instead of requiring specific performance, the court chose to safeguard its
unprecedented recognition of a constitutional right in conservative fashion.
Rejecting the taking of punitive steps against the government, 118 the court
sought only to give the defendant what remained of his bargain. Clearly,
enforcing what was left of the bargain did not fully satisfy Cooper's original
expectations. Perhaps the moderate scope of the remedy granted was an attempt
by the court to mitigate the dramatic effect recognition of the right could have
on the criminal justice system, as well as to illustrate the reasonableness of its
conclusion.
In Virgin Islands v. Scotland,119 the Third Circuit rejected the Cooper
court's choice of remedy. 20 The court argued that instead of granting specific
performance, the defendant should be allowed to withdraw his tendered plea
and refuse to accept any new bargain proposed by the prosecutor. He would then
Broken Plea Bargains, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 471, 516 n.159 (1978) ("ITihe state cannot insist
on the remedy of specific enforcement if its promise can no longer be fully enforced. Thus,
if the defendant can show that specific enforcement is no longer feasible and that he can
no longer be given the full benefit of the state's promise, then he may be entitled to
rescind his guilty plea." (citation omitted)).
Cooper was given the option of entering a plea of guilty to one of the three counts
on which he was convicted in exchange for the government's dismissal of the remaining
two counts. The court disregarded the other obligations of the proposal to which the
defendant may have been held and released the government from any reciprocal
obligation respecting sentencing recommendations. It assumed that Cooper would plead
guilty on remand, but noted that it could only offer him that option, it could not require
the plea. Should Cooper decide not to plead guilty, the judgment of the lower court would
be reinstated. 594 F.2d at 20-21. Recall that the Cooper case was remanded on the plea
bargain issue alone. See notes 12 & 13 and accompanying text supra. Yet, the court stated
that had it found prejudice in either of the two errors in the conduct of his trial that
Cooper assigned on appeal, his options on remand would have been greatly expanded. 594
F.2d at 14 n.1.
116. 594 F.2d at 20-21.
117. To avoid prejudice, further proceedings, including any sentencing recommenda-
tions, were to be conducted before a district judge who had not participated in the prior
proceeding. Id. at 21. Had the remedy been provided on the basis of contract law, the
government would have had to put Cooper in the position he would have been in had it
performed in full. Therefore, the government may have been required to give Cooper the
benefit of its sentencing recommendation to an unbiased judge.
118. The court took no punitive steps against the government beyond the approximate
specific performance, implying that it was influenced by the fact that the government had
not intentionally harassed the defendant. Id. at 20-21.
119. 614 F.2d 360 (3d Cir. 1980).
120. Id. at 365.
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be entitled to exercise his constitutional right to trial by jury. Reasoning that
the right to a jury trial is considered a sufficient remedy for the defendant who
has not been offered a plea, the court held that there is no rational basis for
concluding that the right is insufficient for a defendant who has been offered a
plea, but has not relied upon it to his detriment. 12 1 However, the court relied on
Santobello to conclude that once the defendant shows detrimental reliance, due
process guarantees are implicated and the government is estopped from
reneging on its promise.
The Scotland court reverted to the use of contractual reliance to define a
defendant's constitutional rights, even though earlier in its opinion it stated
that "constitutional standards require more than contract principles."'122 It was
not persuaded by the narrowness of the Fourth Circuit's holding or the
reasonableness of Cooper's expectations. Therefore, faced with the facts in
Cooper, the Third Circuit would have concluded that the defendant had shown
no detrimental reliance. The court did not recognize that a defendant could form
a reasonable expectation on the basis of government negotiations that he would
not be brought to trial because bringing the defendant to trial clearly would not
remedy the loss of those expections.
REFINING Cooper: FOURTH CIRCUIT INTERPRETATIONS
Since its decision in Cooper, the Fourth Circuit on two occasions was given
the opportunity to explain and refine the reasoning on which the decision was
based. In United States v. McIntosh,'2 3 the defendant claimed that his federal
tax evasion prosecution was barred because a state prosecutor had promised that
no federal charges would be brought following his plea of guilty to gambling
charges in state court.124 Relying on the findings of the district court, the court
held that the promise had not been made.' 25 But more importantly, the court
held that even if the promise had been made, it was unenforceable because the
state prosecutor had no authority from federal officers to offer the promise.' 26
In reaching its decision in McIntosh, the Fourth Circuit found that Cooper
was clearly distinguishable. According to the court, Cooper stood for the
proposition that the technical rules of contract could not operate to defeat the
reasonable acceptance by a defendant of an offer made by a government officer
with actual or apparent authority. However, "Cooper does not shun fundamental
contract and agency principles where [as in Mclntosh] the content and validity
of a plea bargain is at issue."'27 Applying the traditional concepts of contract
121. Id. The court reasoned that a prosecutor is under no duty to plea bargain - he
can simply let a case go to trial.
122. Id. at 364.
123. 612 F.2d 835 (4th Cir. 1979).
124. Id. at 836.
125. Id.




and agency, the court concluded that "a bare representation by an unauthorized
party cannot bind federal prosecutors to forego prosecution."'128
IN United States v. Society of Independent Gasoline Marketers of America,129
Robert R. Cavin and others were convicted of violating section one of the Sherman
Act 130 by engaging in a conspiracy to set prices for the retail sale of gasoline.' 3 'As
part of its initial investigation, the government subpoenaed Cavin and Richard
Reynolds, a fellow employee, to testify before the grand jury. Before they were to
testify, the federal prosecutor on several occasions assured the witness' attorneys
that Cavin and Reynolds were to be given immunity. 132 With these assurances,
Cavin and Reynolds met in order to refresh each other's recollection and supplement
their respective knowledge with regard to incriminating evidence. 133 When the two
men arrived at the grand jury hearing, Reynolds was formally granted immunity as
promised, but a defense attorney was informed that Cavin would not be granted
immunity at the same time because of what was claimed to be a scheduling
problem. 134 Reynolds then proceeded to give his testimony which implicated Cavin
in the conspiracy. Cavin, who was never formally granted immunity, was indicted
and convicted. 1
35
The Fourth Circuit reversed Cavin's conviction, holding that the govern-
ment's conduct violated the court's decision in Cooper.'36 Although the court did
not explicitly state that its decision was based on the Constitution, it seemed to
suggest that in a situation such as this, where it is undisputed that the offers of
immunity were made and the defendant acted reasonably in relying on these
offers, the sixth amendment required that the promise be enforced in order to
maintain the defendant's confidence in his attorney's effectiveness and
capabilities. 137 Significantly, the court dismissed the district court's decision
that Cavin's reliance was unreasonable because defense counsel should have
128. Id. (citing United States v. Long, 511 F.2d 878 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
895 (1975)).
129. 624 F.2d 461 (4th Cir. 1979).
130. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
131. 624 F.2d at 463.
132. These assurances were given to each of the three successive attorneys who were
retained by Cavin and Reynolds. Id. at 469-71. In addition, the prosecutor showed one of
the attorneys a document which indicated an authorization of immunity for both Cavin
and Reynolds. Id. at 471.
133. Id. at 470.
134. Id. at 471.
135. Cavin originally filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, but the district court
denied the motion. The Fourth Circuit dismissed Cavin's appeal, holding that the denial of
the motion was not a final judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976). United States v.
Cavin, 553 F.2d 871 (4th Cir. 1977).
136. 624 F.2d at 472. The court also relied on its decision in United States v. Carter,
454 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1972), where the court enforced a plea bargain in which the federal
prosecutor promised the defendant that he would not be prosecuted elsewhere with regard
to certain stolen checks.
137. 624 F.2d at 472 (quoting Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1979)).
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been aware of the many changing variables involved in grants of immunity.
According to the Fourth Circuit, "Itihe question is whether Cavin, as a layman,
acted reasonably in relying upon [the prosecutor's] assurances of immunity, and
our appraisal of such reliance should not be made on the basis of any
fine-fingered legal analysis."13 Without elaborating, the court intimated that
Cavin's reliance consisted of his conversations with Reynolds in which
incriminating evidence was revealed, as well as the fact that both men retained
the same attorney on the assumption that the grants of immunity would negate
any conflict of interest.
139
Thus, in both McIntosh and Society of Independent Gasoline Marketers, the
Fourth Circuit was provided with an opportunity to define the constitutional
and practical limits of its decision in Cooper. Instead, in both cases the court left
unresolved the scope of these limitations. In McIntosh, the court found Cooper
inapplicable, holding that the traditional rules of contract and agency must
apply when the content of the plea bargain and the authority for its offer are at
issue."0 In that situation, the validity of the offer cannot rest on the subjective
belief of the defendant or his counsel. Arguably, this conclusion is correct in
light of the holding in Cooper that the defendant's reliance and expectations
must be reasonable in order to enforce the plea bargain.141 In Society of
Independent Gasoline Marketers, although the court relied on Cooper to support
its decision, the court easily could have based its decision on contract analogies
alone. Not only was the proposal specific and unambiguous in form, and made
by a prosecutor with actual authority, as in Cooper,42 but the defendant had
relied on the offer to his detriment by revealing incriminating evidence to a
grand jury witness. 143
138. 624 F.2d at 473 (emphasis added).
139. In reversing Cavin's conviction, however, the court remanded the case to the
district court for a new trial because the applicable immunity statute only presecribes use
immunity, not transactional immunity. If the government decided to proceed with a new
trial, it could not use any of the evidence directly or indirectly resulting from its
assurances of immunity to Cavin and Reynolds. 624 F.2d at 473-74.
140. United States v. McIntosh, 612 F.2d 835, 837 (4th Cir. 1979).
141. In McIntosh, the offer by the state prosecutor consisted of a promise to call his
brother-in-law who was a local agent for the Internal Revenue Service. Id. at 836.
142. Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12, 19 (4th Cir. 1979).
143. United States v. Soc'y of Independent Gasoline Marketers, 624 F.2d 461, 472-73
(4th Cir. 1979).
It is also interesting to compare the Fourth Circuit's discussions of precisely
whose expectations are to be considered when deciding whether to enforce a broken plea
bargain. McIntosh indicates that the reasonableness of the defendant's expectations
depends upon either the reasonableness of his attorney's belief that the promise is valid or
that the defendant was expected to know himself that a state prosecutor had no authority
to make a promise binding on federal officials. However, because the court in Soc'y of
Independent Gasoline Marketers clearly stated that the reasonableness of the attorney's
belief does not enter into the calculation of the reasonableness of the defendant's
expectations, see text accompanying note 138 supra, future defendants conceivably could
be held to have a knowledge of the legal system which they do not in fact possess. Further,
if the emphasis is placed on the defendant's expectations alone, it is difficult to understand





The major weakness of the Cooper decision is its failure to analyze and
support the conclusions it reaches. The application of fifth amendment
protection to the defendant's expectations has been evident in a long line of plea
bargaining cases and is rightly recognized by the court in Cooper. However, the
court's failure to explain adequately its application of the due process right and
its broad reading of Santobello may render its decision of little persuasive effect.
In addition, other courts may conclude that Cooper draws too fine a line in
construing the sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel as broad
enough to encompass a defendant's belief in his counsel's incompetence arising
from an act of the government absent some showing of actual counsel
incompetence.
Nevertheless, several courts have adopted Cooper despite these
weaknesses. 144 This may signal a gradual and reasonable recognition of the
statement by the Supreme Court in Santobello that the defendant must be
treated with fairness throughout the plea bargaining process. 145 The making of
an offer by the government, and the formation of reasonable expectations on the
basis of that offer, are integral parts of this bargaining process and merit
constitutional protection not only to protect the rights of the defendant, but to
preserve the public's faith in the system of justice itself.146 Although the court
in Cooper expressly left open the limits of its decision,'1 47 as the Fourth Circuit
refines and supports its basically sound reasoning in subsequent cases, 148 more
courts may be persuaded to go beyond the use of contract analogies where the
interests of justice require.
144. See, e.g., Turner v. Fair, 476 F. Supp. 874 (D. Mass. 1979); United States v.
Fischetti, 475 F. Supp. 1145 (D. N.J. 1979).
145. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261-62 (1971).
146. "There is more at stake than just the liberty of this defendant. At stake is the
honor of the government, public confidence in the fair administration of justice, and the
efficient administration of justice in a federal scheme of government." Cooper v. United
States, 594 F.2d 12, 20 (4th Cir. 1979) (quoting United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426 (4th
Cir. 1972) (Winter, J.)).
147. Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12, 18 (4th Cir. 1979).
148. See United States v. Soc'y of Independent Gasoline Marketers, 624 F.2d 461 (4th
Cir. 1979); United States v. McIntosh, 612 F.2d 835 (4th Cir. 1979). Cf. text accompanying
notes 123 to 143 (distinguishing Cooper).
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